INTRODUCTION
Worry is a common human expe rience . Everyone worries e very once in a while . When it become s e xce ssive , uncontrollable , and chronically pre sent, however, the constant discomfort, disruption, and loss of joy in life can be come intole rable and may re sult in a condition known diagnostic ally as ge ne ralize d anxie ty disorde r (GAD) whose central characte ristic is chronic worry [se e Diagnostic and Statistical Man ual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.) , abbre viate d DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994] .
Despite the commonplace nature of worry, syste matic inve stigation de vote d to unde rstanding the phe nomenon did not be gin until the early 1980s. Prior to that time, most of the available research came from the te st anxie ty literature , whe re in the distinction was made be tween the cognitive (or worry) compone nts of anxie ty and its e motional (or physiological) compone nts. Significantly, corre lational studie s indicate d that it was the forme r, and not the latte r, e le ments that predicte d poor te st pe rformance and low grade -point ave rage (cf. Deffe nbache r, 1980; Hembree , 1988; Seipp, 1991) . O ur own research group be came inte reste d in worry as a conseque nce of e arlie r re se arch on insomnia and its tre atment that found re lationships similar to those de te rmine d for test anxie ty. A serie s of inve stigations ultimate ly le d to the conclusion that many psychologically base d insomnias were cause d, not by pe riphe ral physiological hype ractivity as had be en previously suppose d (Monroe , 1967) , but by intrusive cognitive activity at bedtime (cf. Borkove c, 1979) . A significant portion of that cognitive activity see med to be be st describe d as worrying, and not surprisingly the topic about which insomniacs most often worried was whether or not the y would be able to get to slee p that night.
Since the early 1980s, rese arch on worry has grown conside rably, and a great de al has be en learned about its nature , functions, consequences, and origins. There is one remarkable feature associate d with this area of inve stigation that is worthy of comment, a feature like ly due to its relative newcomer status in the scientific domain. Increasingly in recent years, psychology has be en viewing human beings are nonline ar dynamical syste ms involving the moment-to-mome nt interactions among multiple leve ls of responding (e.g., attentional, conceptual, imaginal, affective, physiological, and behavioral) to constantly changing environme nts. What we think affects how we feel, what we feel affe cts how we think, how we think and fee l affect how we be have , how we behave affects how we feel, etc. Thus, although it is often necessary to go deeply into the inve stigation of particular systems (as often see n in cognitive psychology, psychology of emotions, and psychophysiology) to learn intimate things about their ope ration, e ventually we will ne ed to re turn to the whole individual, realizing that e verything conne cts to e verything else. Research has found that worry is associate d with distinctive characte ristics in each of these various systems. Thus, continue d inve stigation of worry can pote ntially te ll a gre at de al us about the mutually interactive influe nces of the se processes in human be ings.
The present article has two, relate d goals. First, we wish to describe those distinctive proce sses in various re sponse syste ms that are characte ristic of worry and that may make up the elements of a dynamical relationship that possibly unde rlies its occurrence . Second, we will attempt to show how the se inte ractive e lements may contribute to the mainte nance , persistence, and e ven stre ngthe ning of this distre ssing activity.
THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF WORRY: PREDOMINANCE OF THOUGHT, COGNITIVE AVOIDANCE, AND THE INHIBITION OF EMOTIONAL PROCESSING
Descriptive ly, worry involve s a predominance of ne gative ly vale nced ve rbal thought activity. When we worry, we are talking to ourse lve s a lot about negative things, most often about ne gative events that we are afraid might happe n in the future . Image ry is less notice d in worry. The first de monstration of this dominance of thought came from comparisons of mental sample s obtaine d from GAD clie nts and control participants during self-re laxation and worry induction pe riods (Bork-ove c & Inz, 1990) . Nonanxious pe ople re porte d mostly positive image ry and little though t dur ing re laxation , whe re as GAD clie nts re porte d e qual am ounts of thoughts and image s, both of which were ne gative in emotional tone . Whe n asked to worry about a curre nt concern, a shift to a marke d pre dominance of negative thought ove r image s occurre d for both groups. Importantly, successful the rapy change d the clie nts' thought/image ry ratios; they were no longe r different from those of nonanxious people .
The distinction be tween the two cognitive phe nome na of thought and image ry is of crucial functional importance for unde rstanding their re spe ctive roles in e motional disturbance and its treatme nt. Ve rbal thoughts about e motional material elicit very little cardiovascular response , whe re as image s of the same mate rial e voke significantly gre ate r re sponse (V rana, Cuthbe rt, & Lang, 1986) . Moreover, pe ople spontane ously use ve rbalization as a strate gy for abstraction, disengage ment, and emotion control that can decrease sympathe tic arousal to ave rsive material (Tucker & Newman, 1981) . The abstract conceptual syste m, including the ve rbal syste m, is the re fore le ss closely conne cted to e fferent command into affe ctive , physiological, and be havioral syste ms than image s are.
The relative isolation of the verbal system is evolutionarily significant, because it give s humans a capability to inhibit responding, to search memory, and to experiment in the mind with different possible response s without immediate environme ntal consequence. If every thought we ever had was immediate ly expressed, successful adaptation (especially interpersonal) would be very difficult, and environme ntal and social punishme nt would be frequent. So having a thought system that is somewhat remote from other systems is adaptive . However, this feature has a potential negative consequence for any emotional disorde r that is characte rized by thought predominance . It means that emotional processing will be inhibite d, and thus negative emotional meaning and emotional disturbance will be maintaine d. As Foa and Kozak (1986) have argue d, for repeated exposure s to phobic stimuli to be therapeutic, it is necessary that comple te emotional processing of fear-related material occur. Absence of physiological response during the presentation of emotional material is taken as evide nce that the entire fear structure stored in memory has not been accessed and that extinction will therefore not take place . We have to confront not only feared situations to overcome our fear of them, but we also have to feel the fear during the confrontations. Interestingly, Mowre r's (1947) two-stage theory of anxie ty, upon which so much of modern behavior therapy was based in its developme nt of therapeutic exposure technique s, explicitly stated that the conditione d response is part of the conditione d stimulus. Exposure to the response -produce d cues of the conditione d response is there fore an important element of extinction process. If, then, worry is predominantly thought and if thought is a poor vehicle for processing emotional information for the sake of changing emotional meanings, the n worrisome ways of dealing with emotional material may active ly inhibit emotional processing and create maintaining conditions for emotional disturbance . In this functional way, worry may be a type of cognitive avoidance to perceived dange rs.
If worry partly functions as a cognitive avoidance re sponse to threate ning stimuli, what might worry be trying to avoid? The re may be se ve ral functional le ve ls to this que stion.
Worry Su ppresses Som atic Anxiety
At a short-te rm le ve l, we do know that worry suppre sse s cardiovascular response to threate ning image s. Spe ech-anxious participants who engage in worrisome thinking just prior to phobic image presentations show no cardiovascular re sponse at all to the image s. O n the othe r hand, participants who think re laxing thoughts or ne utral thoughts do show significant he art rate re actions to the image s, with the relaxation condition showing signs of e xtinction during re peate d e xposure s (Borkove c & Hu, 1990) . Furthe rmore , the amount of thinking taking place during worry pre dicts the e xte nt to which such physiological response s are mute d (Borkove c, Lyonfie lds, Wise r, & Diehl, 1993) . ''Cogito, e rgo I can suppre ss affect.'' If worry as an avoidance re sponse doe s immediate ly suppre ss somatic/affe ctive aspe cts of anxious e xpe rience, it may there by be negative ly reinforce d.
At this point, how worry provide s this suppre ssion is spe culative . It may involve the actual suppre ssion of ave rsive image s, but this se ems unlike ly. Worry may well prime catastrophic image s so that the y happe n at an incre ase d fre quency during a worrisome episode . It is more like ly that worrisome thinking is the immediate cognitive avoidance response to such image s when they do occur. The demonstrate d suppre ssive e ffects of worry on somatic anxie ty could also be due to the fact that worry uses up significant amounts of atte ntional re source (Mathe ws, 1990) , is difficult to shift away from (Parkinson & Rachman, 1981) , insulate s its thoughts from affe ctive meaning through the semantic satiation inhe rent in its repetitive verbal activity (Smith, 1984) , and create s less mismatch betwee n information expe cted and information re ceived (Gray, 1982) .
O ne recent finding may represent a furthe r key for unde rstanding how worry affe cts image ry: Worrisome thought is characte rize d by reduce d concre te ness. Research conducte d within the frame work of the dual-coding the ory (Paivio, 1986) has de monstrate d that ge nerating image s from abstract (as compare d to concrete) words and sentence s re quire s greate r time and produce s image s that are more abstract and le ss vivid. Whether abstract or concrete, however, verbal thoughts and image s are always proce ssed inte grative ly (Paivio & Marschark, 1991) . Thus, if worry involve s thought, it can still prime catastrophic image s. Yet, if worrisome thought is abstract, the associate d image ry will be le ss vivid and the refore less intrusive and attention-grabbing. Be ing of reduce d concre te ness, worrisome thought would not suppre ss image ry but would merely activate image s that are le ss concre te and vivid. This reasoning would also explain why re search participants have reporte d lessene d image ry afte r the expe rimental induction of worry (Borkove c & Inz, 1990) ; it is harde r to detect or e asie r to ignore . In sum, worriers may escape fe arful image ry by focusing on the verbal channe l while thinking about the future in more abstract te rms, e.g., "some thing awful will happe n," with few concre te details.
In support of this line of re asoning, Stöbe r (1997) has demonstrate d that worrisome thought is inde ed le ss concrete. Participants in these studie s sele cted topics about which the y did and did not worry and then elaborate d on the proble ms present in the se topics by listing possible risks and ne gative conse quences. For example , job loss could be a risk for a financial worry, and moving into a smalle r apartme nt could be one of its ne gative conse quences. All answers were rated for concretene ss and image ry by inde pe nde nt judge s. Elaborations on worry topics were found to be of lower concre te ness and le ssene d image ry quality than for nonworry topics. More ove r, the more participants worried about the topic, the le ss concre te and image ry-eliciting were the associate d proble m e laborations. This outcome sugge sts that, in re sponse to initial aversive image s, worry might mitigate the vividne ss of furthe r ne gative image s and there by mute physiological reaction to the ir occurre nce .
Regardle ss of how the suppre ssion of affect occurs, the most significant conseque nce for worry's avoidant function and pre clusion of emotional processing is that anxious me anings are maintaine d. Worry is in this way no diffe re nt from Mowre r's (1947) be havioral avoidance of phobic stimuli in its functions and conseque nce s: Despite creating conditions that restrict the individual 's life and/or generate othe r kinds of disturbance , s/he can reduce some distressing e xpe rie nce s by avoiding the ir source. As in Mowrer's the ory, howe ve r, mainte nance of fear is the conse quence .
It has also bee n found that worry that precedes e xposure s to actual (inste ad of imaginal) phobic e ve nts gene rate s a somewhat differe nt proce ss that results all the same in a similar perseveration of anxious meanings. Although worry just prior to actual spe e ch pre se ntations doe s not inhibit the cardiovascu lar re sponse of spe ech phobics, subje ctive anxie ty incre ase s upon re petitious e xposure s (HazlettSte ve ns, 1997b) . Spe ech phobics who relax or engage d in ne utral activity prior to each e xposure , on the othe r hand, show decline s in anxious expe rience . Moreove r, worrying just afte r e xposure to a stressor increases cognitive intrusions about the stressor over the subse quent thre e days, whereas imaginal re he arsals of the stressor or merely ne utral conditions just after the stre ss e vent do not generate such intrusions (Butle r, Wells, & Dewick, 1995) . Thus, worry be fore or after emotional e ve nts pre clude s adaptive processing of the mate rial and contribute s to a mainte nance or eve n an increase in the e motional disturbance gene rate d by those events.
Worry as an Attempt to Avoid Negative Events or to Prepare for the Worst
At a se cond, more long-te rm leve l of ide ntifying the source of worry's cognitive avoidance function, people do attribute avoidant functions to their worrying, and the re may be good reasons for these attributions. The highe st rate d reasons for worrying give n by both GAD and nonanxious individuals are that (a) it helps the m discove r ways of avoiding ne gative future eve nts and (b) it prepare s the m for the worst if they cannot avoid it (Borkove c & Roemer, 1995) . Eysenck (1992) has presente d a cognitive mode l of worry process that capture s these phe nomena. In his mode l, worry had thre e major functions: alarm, prompt, and preparation. Upon exte rnal or internal de te ction of thre at, the alarm function introduce s information about the threat into aware ne ss. The prompt function the n brings threat-relate d thoughts and image s from long-te rm memory into conscious aware ne ss. The pre paration function finally permits the individual to anticipate ne gative scenarios of the future (catastrophizing) . This function allows him/he r to initiate anticipatory coping either by acting to prevent the anticipate d negative developme nts (prevention) or by preparing for the e xpe cted negative conseque nce s (anticipatory coping) . Eysenck conceded that the evide nce for the third function is rathe r inconsiste nt. Howe ve r, the findings that worry is associate d with proble m e laborations of re duced concrete ness (Stöbe r, 1997) may provide a basis for it. Whe n forming internal task models and action plans for prevention and pre paration, concretene ss is a crucial variable (Schönpflug, 1989) . Abstract models are unlike ly to lead to concrete actions. Worry, characte rized by low concre te ness, is unlike ly to provide a solid basis for the implementation of concre te ste ps for coping with the proble m. Without the se lection of an appropriate coping strate gy, the threat is preserved, and worry continue s.
Still, it is unde rstandable that worriers may think that worry involve s anticipatory proble m solving when one conside rs the situation commonly faced by someone in the midst of a worrisome e pisode . S/he is detecting threat cue s that warn of some possible future catastrophe . De te ction of thre at naturally generate s a primitive fight-or-flight re sponse . Be cause the thre at refers to a none xiste nt future and is fre quently about events that cannot be controlle d and are not going to happe n anyway (cf. Borkove c & Newman, in press), the re is no one to fight and no whe re to flee . The thre at still exists in the pe rson's mind, and s/he the re fore remains convince d that it must be avoide d. In this circumstance , mentally trying to de te rmine how to avoid the threat or to pre pare for its occurrence remains as one of the fe w coping response s available .
A final way in which worry may function as avoidance at this long-te rm leve l is found in the supe rstitious re inforce ment paradigm inhe rent in its occurrence . Be cause very few things about which people worry actually turn out bad, the majority of worry is eventually ne gative ly re inforce d by the nonoccurre nce of the feared eve nts. This e nvironme ntal continge ncy may well be the foundation for reports by people that they worry be cause it fe els as if the worrying makes the occurrence of the feare d e ve nt less like ly, e ven though they admit that no logical conne ction exists (Borkove c & Roe mer, 1995) .
Although rathe r straightforward applications of Mowrer's two-stage le arning the ory of fear and avoidance and ne gative reinforce ment principle s unde rlying superstitious be havior can provide an unde rstandable basis for the origins and maintaining conditions of worry, cognitive proce sse s at highe r le ve ls can e ve ntually be come functionally implicate d. If chronic worriers come to be lieve that worry some how has positive conse quence s, prevents bad things from happe ning, pre pare s the m for the worst, or is a major distre ssing proble m in and of itse lf, such unde rlying be lie fs can contribute furthe r to the mainte nance of worrisome proce ss. We lls (1995) in particular has discusse d the pote ntial role of such "meta-worry" in changing normal worries into the kind of excessive and uncontrollable worry characte ristic of generalize d anxie ty disorde r.
Worry as a Distraction from Mor e Em otion ally Lad en Top ics
At a third le vel, it may be that pe ople , e spe cially for severe GAD individuals, worry about superficial things that se rve to distract them from the re al proble m. In a certain sense, such a function appe ars to be inhe rent to any anxie ty proble m from the point of vie w of cognitive behavioral therapy. Its the oretical context sugge sts that moment-to-mome nt self-talk is merely a re flection of de eper belief structures and that what people report about what it is that the y fe ar is really somewhat remote from the unde rlying fe ar. Thus it is that de catastrophizing method is used in an e ffort to help the clie nt ide ntify what that dee pe r fe ar might be . For example , a pe rson who is afraid of giving spee che s like ly has brie f thoughts and image s that indicate possible poor pe rformance and negative reactions by the audie nce. But such cognitions are ne gative only to the exte nt that they are associate d with the pote ntial for the occurrence of even more significant ne gative events that might follow from these. It is not so much anothe r's negative evaluation that is feared but rathe r what might happe n because of that evaluation (e.g., abandonme nt, be ing fire d from a job) . And e ach of the se unde rlying fe ars may have de eper laye rs of catastrophe that drive their significance (e .g., loss of job might mean inability to care for one se lf or family). We do know that worriers have much richer associative networks in this re gard: The y ge ne rate significantly more de catastrophization steps that do nonworrie rs (Vase y & Borkove c, 1992) . But in daily life, people are large ly aware only of the more surface fears and rare ly acce ss thoughts about what the bottom-line catastrophe actually might be.
GAD individuals also diffe r from nonanxious people on only one ite m among the above -mentione d rating scale s regarding re asons for worrying: "Worrying about most of the things I worry about is a way to distract myse lf from worrying about eve n more e motional things, things that I don't want to think about." No direct evide nce exists to support the validity of this re port. Howe ver, if it is a valid observation, the n othe r re se arch has provide d clue s about what these unde rlying proble ms might be . First, GAD clie nts re port the historical occurrence of more fre quent traumas than do nonanxious people , yet the y worry le ss about illne ss/de ath/injury the mes than any othe r topic category ( Roemer, Molina, & Borkove c, 1997; Roemer, Molina, Litz, & Borkove c, 1997) . So the worries that the y now have may have originate d from actual traumatic e vents that provide d evide nce that dange rs exist in the world (and thus the y nee d to anticipate othe r future dange rs) and may at the same time provide distraction from the e ve n more emotionally disturbing eve nts of their past. The se cond possible source of worry re side s in the proble matic re lationships that GAD clients have had in the past and continue to have in the ir pre se nt inte rpe rsonal re lationships (discusse d late r). In either of case, worrying about othe r things allows avoidance of the more threate ning mate rial.
WORRY, HIGHER-ORDER CONDITIONING, AND THE SPREADING OF ANXIOUS MEANINGS
The ne gative re inforce ment of worrisome activity de scribed above in its various versions would provide one mechanism for the stre ngthe ning of the activity and thus contribute to the mainte nance of both the worrying itself and the anxious meanings associate d with its topics. Anothe r pote ntial mechanism that contribute s to furthe r elaborations of anxious meaning was reveale d in a laboratory inve stigation of highe r-orde r conditioning among GAD clie nts and matched control partici-pants (Thaye r & Borkove c, 1995) . In this procedure , one type of conditional stimulus preceded the prese ntation of neutral words, whe re as a diffe re nt type of conditional stimulus pre cede d the presentation of thre atening words. Controls displaye d habituation of the cardiovascular orienting response ove r all trials, but GAD clie nts did not. GAD clie nts showe d de fe nsive re sponse s to thre at words but not to nonthre at words, whe re as controls had no defensive re sponse to any word stimulus. Most significantly, GAD clients develope d an orie nting re sponse to the conditional stimuli associate d with the thre at words. Thus, ave rsive words can yie ld classically conditione d attentional re sponse s to previously neutral stimuli. This sugge sts that, as GAD clie nts e ngage in their constant ne gative inte rnal dialogue , there are conditioning proce sses taking place that can be reasonably vie wed as partly responsible for the de ve lopme nt of their characte ristic hype rvigile nce for threat and for the ge ne ralization of thre atening cues.
WORRY AND OTHER INFORMATION PROCESSING TASK S
The past decade and a half has also give n rise to a conside rable amount of research on GAD and/or worry as the y re late to othe r information proce ssing phenome na. Much of this lite rature has be e n re vie wed by Mathe ws ( 1990) and Mathe ws and MacLeod ( 1994) . For e xample , GAD clients interpre t ambiguous information in a negative way, and they predict greate r like lihood of ne gative e ve nts happe ning in their future s. GAD clients also more rapidly identify and re act to threat cues in their e nvironme nts than nonanxious people , and the y are not aware that the y are doing so. Despite such ide ntifications, the y do not e xplicitly recall the threat stimuli see n, but implicit memory for the threats is enhance d. Thus, once again, we see in these memory results the avoidant prope rties of worrisome activity. Most of the studie s docume nting memory e ffects such as these have used very brief e xposure s to thre ate ning stimuli and/or active response re quire ments. O ur own work has found the opposite effe cts in the above -mentione d highe r-orde r conditioning study, wherein le ngthy (8-s) e xposure s to the threat words and passive observation of them without a re sponse re quire ment resulte d in significantly gre ater explicit re call of the thre at words than the nonthre at words for GAD clients than for their matche d controls.
The constant ne gative ly vale nced conte nt of their cognitions and their attentional and interpre tive biase s toward threat sugge st a kind of affe ctive and cognitive infle xibility in GAD and worry. Furthe r support for such rigidity has bee n found in two recent studie s dire ctly aime d at cognitive flexibility: GAD clients re port lower le ve ls of cognitive flexibility on a que stionnaire de signe d to measure this construct (Hazle tt-Steve ns, 1997a) , and worry induce s lowe red variability of topics mentione d in stre am of consciousne ss re ports compare d to stre ams obtaine d during rest periods (Molina, Borkove c, Pe ase ly, & Person, 1998) .
Fin ally, worry ha s be e n de monstrate d to affe ct de cision -m aking spe e d (Metzge r, Mille r, Cohen, Sofka, & Borkove c, 1990). Chronic worrie rs take longe r than nonworrie rs to de cide whether a geometric stimulus doe s or doe s not match a training stimulus, increasingly so as the ambiguity of the te st stimuli increase s.
This effe ct appe ars to be cause d by worry: Nonworrie rs who worry for a fe w minute s before e ngaging in the task show the same effe ct. Also of inte re st is the fact that a relaxation induction preceding the task causes a normalization of the reaction times of chronic worriers. The de laye d decision making associate d with worry in this study has its more molar clinical representation in the fre que nt procrastination reporte d by our GAD clients in the rapy. Such procrastination appe ars to be due to their fear of failure and its unde rlying social e valuative conce rns. A recent study supporte d the intimate re lationship betwee n worry, procrastination, and evaluative concerns (Joormann & Stöber, 1997) . High worrie rs re porte d more procrastination and highe r perfectionism. Analyse s of the individual dimensions of pe rfe ctionism (Frost, Marte n, Lahart, & Rose nblate , 1990) showe d that the corre lation be tween worry and pe rfe ctionism was not due to highe r personal standards but rathe r to increased concerns about mistake s and doubts about actions. More ove r, partial correlations indicate d that these characte ristics were spe cific for worriers: When controlling for anxie ty and de pre ssion, the corre lations with worry we re hardly atte nuate d. When controlling for worry, howe ve r, the pre viously significant correlations of anxie ty and depression with procrastination and perfe ctionism droppe d to value s around zero.
WORRY AND DEPRESSION
As is obvious from the re view thus far, much of the worry literature has focused on its role in anxie ty and anxie ty disorde rs. Its inhibition of emotional processing may well be re le vant, however, to any e motional proble m whe re in e motional processing is a ne cessary the rape utic event. That is, worry may maintain othe r e motional disorde rs, like panic disorde r and obsessive compulsive disorde r; its pre se nce may maintain or stre ngthe n the anxious meanings characte ristic of these disorde rs and pre clude the rape utic change during exposure s to re levant fear stimuli.
It appe ars that worry may also play a role in de pre ssion. Nole n-Hoe ksema's (1996) research sugge sts that depressive rumination, which may be similar in proce ss and content to the worrisome thinking studie d in GAD, is a factor that can maintain the de pre ssive state. Moreove r, laboratory inductions of worry with normal participants e licit both anxie ty and depression in ne arly equal amounts (Andre ws & Borkove c, 1988) . This finding raises some inte resting possibilitie s. It may be that the study of worry can contribute to our unde rstanding of the freque nt coincide nce of anxious and de pre sse d states. For example , the content of worry may alte rnate between thoughts of future fe ared e vents (and thus ge ne rate anxie ty) and thoughts of past ne gative e vents (and thus create depression) . Additionally, a sense of hopele ssness and he nce depression may ofte n occur in chronic worriers whe n the y periodically realize that there is realistically nothing that can be done to avoid the many uncontrollable future e vents that they fear might happe n. Irre spe ctive of how worry can generate both anxie ty and de pre ssion, the fact that it doe s sugge sts that it may be re sponsible for some instance s of their co-occurre nce.
Although the re view thus far has identifie d the varie ty of ways in which worry may involve inte ractions among several type s of cognitive and affe ctive processe s, it turns out that worry is not solely an intrape rsonal process. Mome nt-to-mome nt inte ractions with the e nvironme nt, spe cifically one 's interpe rsonal world, appe ar to play a highly significant role in the origins and mainte nance of worry and GAD.
WORRY AND INTERPERSONAL FACTORS
GAD has be en found to be associate d with a particular form of inse cure childhood attachme nt, and this de ve lopme ntal pre cursor re lates quite close ly with the kinds of inte rpe rsonal difficultie s that they e xpe rience in curre nt interpersonal relationships. Cassidy (1995) found that GAD clie nts re calle d a greate r degree of role re ve rsal and e nme shme nt with their primary caregive rs. Thus, in childhood the y had to take care of, and anticipate dange rs for, not only the mselves but also the ir pare nt(s). Such a history could reasonably le ad to an adulthood wherein the world is viewed as a pote ntially dange rous place and one 's ability to cope is constantly questione d. Intriguingly, the majority of adult GAD clients also fall into the ove rly nurturing cluste r (Pincus & Borkove c, 1994) on the Inventory of Interpersonal Proble ms (Horowitz, Rosenbe rg, & Bartholome w, 1993) . So many individuals with GAD may have le arne d as youngste rs that taking care of othe rs is ne cessary in order to receive love and approval, and they continue to do this in adulthood. Unfortunate ly, the ir overnurturance actually results in le sse ned like lihood of having the ir interpersonal nee ds met; the y are often se en by othe rs as intrusive in their caring attempts.
PHYSIOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF WORRY AND GAD
GAD and worry also appe ar to be strongly link to a distinctive psychophysiology whose characte ristics may provide the foundation for othe r associate d attentional and inte rpe rsonal maladaptive processes. GAD individuals do not show the typical sympathe tic activation in response to threat or challe nge as do individuals with the othe r anxie ty disorde rs. Instead, the y show a re duction in the range of physiolog ical variabili ty, le ading Hoe hn-Sari c and colle ague s (Hoe hn- Saric & McLeod, 1988; Hoe hn-Saric, McLeod, & Z imme rli, 1989) to conclude that they are chronically in a state of sympathe tic inhibition. Given that GAD clients are constantly detecting threat, yet that thre at cannot be avoide d be cause it e xists only in the ir minds and only in the future , fight-or-flight reactions se rve no use ful purpose and can only be suppre ssed. Worrisome thinking is one way to provide that suppre ssion. These individuals ' restricte d range of pe riphe ral physiological variability appe ars to be due to a vagal (parasympathe tic) de ficiency. GAD clients display lower parasympathe tic tone at re st than do nonanxious individuals, and an induce d state of worry can phasically create a reduction in vagal tone (Lyonfie lds, Borkove c, & Thaye r, 1995; Thaye r, Friedman, & Borkove c, 1996) . The importance of parasympathe tic de ficiency in GAD become s clearer when one conside rs othe r rese arch that indicate s that stronge r vagal tone is significantly relate d to more adaptive atte ntional deployme nt (Porge s, 1992; Richards, 1987) .
There may also be important brain wave characte ristics associate d with GAD. Understanding central nervous syste m contributions to anxie ty has be en base d large ly on global conne ctions made in re search studying negative emotionality and ne uroticism. However, the EEG literature on anxie ty has unfortunate ly used too broad of a definition of anxie ty, leading to a confusing electrocortical picture which lacks spe cificity. More recent spe culation using the basic two-dime nsional structure of emotion sugge sts that vale nce (positive and negative ) and activation (or arousal) are re flected in differe nt cortical are as [cf. Osgood, Suci, & Tanne baum (1957) for a discussion of the two-factor theory of emotionality]. Current spe culation sugge sts the frontal system of the cortex is sensitive to valance , whe reas the more parie tal areas are associate d with activation [cf. Pribram (1981) for a discussion of arousal and activation]. In terms of valance , for e xample , Davidson (1992) sugge sted ne gative affe ctivity and avoidance are associate d with a right frontal cortical involve ment, whereas positivity and approach are associate d with left frontal cortical involve ment. Emotional involve ment in the se studie s is inde xed through relative frontal hemisphe ric EEG alpha. O thers have emphasize d parie tal or temporal differe nces in the processing of emotional activity ( e.g., Ray & Cole , 1985; Tucker, 1981) . The lite rature furthe r sugge sts a reciprocal relationship between frontal and parie tal are as.
In an e valuation of current anxie ty rese arch, Heller and her colle ague s (Helle r, Etie nne , & Mille r, 1995; Helle r, Nitschke , Etie nne , & Mille r, 1997) sugge ste d that part of the lack of clarity lie s with the fie ld's undiffe re ntiate d approach to anxie ty that ignore s diffe re nce s in anxious arousal ( panic) and anxious appre he nsion (worry) . That is to say, studie s e xploring situations which increase arousal may re sult in differential cortical activation than those focused on worry or GAD. At present, fe w ele ctrocortical studie s have e xamine d the arousal dime nsion (like that found in panic disorde r), whe re as the anxious appre he nsion dimension has be en more thoroughly e xplore d. Previous work e xamining anxious appre hension (e.g., Carte r, Johnson, & Borkove c, 1986; Heller e t al., 1997; Tucke r, Antes, Ste nslie , & Barnhardt, 1978; Tyler & Tucker, 1982) has found a greate r frontal asymme try involving le ft hemisphe ric activity in anxious appre hension groups.
In a recent preliminary GAD study from our lab, we compare d GAD clie nts prior to and following 14 se ssions of the rapy and with a control group. Comparing pre the rapy GAD and control individuals in e ach of the three tasks e mploye d (baseline , relaxation, and worry) produce d a picture of differe ntial EEG activity be tween GAD and control individuals. It was found that GAD and control individuals both worry and re lax in differe nt ways, particularly in the EEG alpha bands (8 to 13 Hz). This finding was consiste nt with the sugge stion that GAD individuals e ngage le ss in image ry processe s, supporting the earlie r demonstrations of greate r verbal and le ss imaginal activity in worry and GAD. Also, consiste nt with pre vious research, GAD clie nts displaye d more left frontal be ta activity during the worry task, whereas controls showed more the ta. The se differences sugge st that controls are able to focus on the worry task in a manne r different from the GAD individuals. Furthe r, the E E G s of GAD clie nts appe are d more like control s during the posttthe rapy laboratory se ssion than they did during the pre the rapy se ssion; brain wave patte rns had normalize d.
Using an additional signal processing measure , that of cohe rence , i.e., the degree of share d activity be tween two signals, is mathematically similar to the correlation coe fficie nt. The intriguing cohe rence picture that is emerging sugge sts that pre the rapy GAD clie nts show le ss cortical inhibition (little time delay for the similar signal to appe ar throughout the cortex) in comparison to controls. Although additional re search is re quire d, these results may help to she d light on the finding that GAD is associate d with preattentive bias (e .g., shorte r reactions times) and would sugge st that GAD individuals have fewer inhibitory processe s. Less cortical inhibition in our GAD group may he lp us to unde rstand the excessive emotionality or thought proce sse s se en in GAD. This finding is also consiste nt with speculation that the EEG see n in anxie ty is drive n by the limbic syste m in an undiffe rentiate d manne r. Following therapy, GAD clie nts showe d more diffe re ntiate d cohe rence patte rns, particularly those re pre senting longe r distance conne ctions, sugge sting a return of inhibitory proce sse s in the brain. Anothe r pote ntially important coherence finding is that control and GAD groups showe d differe ntial directional patte rns. For example , whereas control individuals displaye d a patte rn of EEG activity moving from more frontal areas of the brain to poste rior are as, GAD clients showed the opposite dire ctionality. This re sult sugge sts that controls have faster acce ss to limbic system processe s, whereas GAD clients de lay such e motional influe nce on frontal lobe proce sse s. Whate ve r the e xact meaning of this directional diffe rentiation be tween GAD and control groups, it is consiste nt with GAD individuals displaying le ss e xe cutive control of mental activitie s and may provide a basis for the uncontrollability of worry that is diagnostically characte ristic of GAD.
In contrast to the traditional signal processing procedure s which de compose (through Fourie r analysis or a similar technique ) the compone nt fre quencies in the EEG and thus reflect a limite d amount of information (one dimensional) , the dynamic vie w sugge sts that a time serie s may be se en to reflect the marks of all othe r variable s participating in the dynamics of the system. From this pe rspective , nonline ar dynamical models may well offe r a characte rization of be havior that is far richer than that obtaine d by classical measure s. In our research, the derive d EEG measure use d is the pointwise or fractal dimension [cf. Lutzenbe rger, Elbe rt, Birbaume r, Ray, & Schupp ( 1992) for a de scription of the exact mathe matical procedure ]. This measure re fle cts information about the numbe r of quasi-inde pe nde nt cell asse mblie s involve d in the pe rformance of a particular task (Lutze nberge r, Preissl, & Pulve rmulle r, 1995) .
The nonline ar perspective sugge sts that the EEG re fle cts comple x processes that appe ar random but may contain a hidde n orde r. Part of the randomne ss comes from the brain's ability to shift abruptly and simultane ously from one activity patte rn to anothe r. It is sugge ste d that containe d within the brain's pote ntial is the ability to organize itself in re lation to internal and exte rnal input and be dire cted by that organization. Furthe rmore , it is sugge ste d that the appare ntly chaotic switching of proce sse s may also contain a mechanism allowing the brain to move be yond a dete rministic history and to initiate nove l acts pe rceive d as ne w ideas and creativity. In the language of chaos, it is the attractor that maintains or refle cts a consiste ncy of proce ssing associate d with a behavioral seque nce . Thus, our task is to de te rmine if a simple unde rlying structure can be se en to unde rlie the see mingly endle ss variation that one obse rve s in the EEG.
Fractal dime nsionality measure s (chaos) showed a differential patte rn of activity from pre -to postthe rapy for our GAD clie nts. Following therapy, the GAD group displaye d lower dime nsionality measure s in the frontal areas during base line measure ments. Furthe r, the GAD group showed greate r diffe re ntiation as me asure d by the fractal dimension be twe e n re laxation and worry tasks following therapy. Again, this sugge sts that therapy helpe d the GAD individual to differentiate processing require ments rathe r than constantly respond with an anxious mindse t. Although the ne uroscie nce lite rature is just be ginning to discuss the functional significance of EEG chaos measure s, the se re sults are consiste nt with a picture of le ss cortical rigidity following the rapy. These data overall sugge st that conside ration of a varie ty of psychophysiological measure s are important for unde rstanding anxiety proce sse s.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Worry distinctive ly involve s a predominance of verbal thought whose function appe ars to be the cognitive avoidance of threat. Thus, like the avoidant motor behavior prese nt in the phobias, worry can be ne gative ly reinforce d and thus stre ngthene d and maintaine d. This functional effe ct occurs be cause of its atte nuation of somatic re actions to ave rsive image s, its flight to abstractne ss, its supe rstitious association with the nonoccurre nce of fe ared outcome s, and its possible service as a distracte r from more distressing e motional mate rial. Be haviorally, worry is associated with procrastination and rigid, maladaptive , interpe rsonal patte rns often involving intrusive , ove rly nurturant behavior. Hypothe tically, the delaye d decision making in procrastination delays punishme nt for mistake s, and taking care of othe rs pre vents social criticism or interpersonal reje ction. The occurrence of worry be fore or after thre atening events lessens the emotional proce ssing of those e ve nts and can lead to an increase in the anxious meanings surrounding those e ve nts. Worry also appe ars to contain mechanisms by which thre atening meanings ge neralize to othe r stimuli: Chronic worriers be come preattentive ly biase d toward detecting cues associate d with thre at, and highe r-orde r conditioning involving worrisome words as the unconditional stimuli can ge nerate increased vigilance to stimuli paire d with those words. Recently discove re d diffe re nce s in autonomic ne rvous syste m and brain wave activity in GAD clie nts are be ginning to offer glimpse s into the possible physiological substrate s of many of the above psychological characte ristics of worry.
As can be see n from the above re view, worry and its clinical manife station in GAD involve rich and comple x phe nomena, just like any othe r human process. In worry, thought, atte ntion, image ry, memory, affect, central and periphe ral physiology, and be havior are all characte ristically involve d. Conseque ntly, furthe r e xpe rimental pursuit of this phe nome non is like ly to teach us a great de al about the dynam ical nature of worry and human anxie ty. It is quite re markable how much has bee n learne d from e mpirical research on the topic in a re lative ly short pe riod of time , but it is also clear that a comple te unde rstanding of this comple x human proce ss will require conside rably more thought and inve stigation. The effort will be worthwhile . Upon gre ater unde rstanding of the proce ss of worry, we can build increasingly effe ctive the rapie s for GAD and for the othe r anxie ty and mood disorders whe re in worry plays a significant role.
